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THE PUZZLING CASE OF THE REVENUEMAXIMIZING LOTTERY
LAWRENCE ZELENAK*

Familiarity with state lotteries obscures their strangest
characteristic-thatthey are designed to extract as much revenue
as possiblefrom lottery consumers. States do not attempt to wring
as much revenue as possible from the consumers of any other
product, either through government monopolies or through
revenue-maximizing taxation. In this Article, Professor Zelenak
considers various possible justifications for the uniquely
unfavorable treatment of lottery consumers.
The Article
concludes that the special state treatment of lotteries cannot be
justified by efficiency analysis, distributionaleffects, or historical
precedent. The Article notes, however, that the previous illegality
of lotteries meant that lotteries could be introduced without
depriving lottery players of any accustomed (legal) consumer
surplus. This unusual circumstance is a legitimate factor in a
utilitarian analysis of the optimal implicit tax rate for a state
lottery, but even it fails to justify revenue-maximization.
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INTRODUCTION

States operate lotteries to make as much money as possible.
Once a state has made the decision to have a lottery, the goal of
revenue maximization is taken for granted. After all, how else would
a state run a lottery? From a broader perspective, however, states'
attempts to exploit the full revenue potential of lotteries are puzzling.
A government could give itself a legal monopoly over any
consumer product or service, and then set prices so as to extract
monopoly profits. But governments in the United States claim few
business monopolies, and in the few non-lottery areas of government
monopoly-most notably publicly-owned utilities, the postal service,
and state liquor stores-governments do not set prices at the profitmaximizing level. Rather than taking over direct ownership of an
industry, a state might realize the rough equivalent of monopoly
profits by imposing a revenue-maximizing excise tax on a particular
consumer product.1 But states do not do this. Even in the case of
"sin" taxes on alcohol and tobacco, states do not attempt to set rates
at the level that will maximize revenue. The puzzle, then, is that state
behavior with respect to lotteries is unique. States do not attempt to
wring every last dollar out of the consumers of any other product,
either by direct ownership or by taxation.
This Article begins by documenting that uniqueness. Part I
demonstrates the revenue-maximizing goal of lotteries; for many
1. See Appendix infra pp. 41-43 for a discussion of the possibility of imposing an
excise tax that produces revenue similar to the profit from a fully exploited monopoly.
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states this demonstration requires nothing more than a quotation
from an express legislative directive. Part II describes the very
different approach taken by the states regarding the revenue
exploitation of other products. Examples include excise taxation of
alcohol and tobacco, and government monopolies over utilities, liquor
stores, and vanity license plates. Part III considers some possible
justifications for the unique treatment of lotteries. Neither efficiency
nor distributional considerations point to the desirability of profitmaximizing lotteries. History is no more helpful. There is ample
eighteenth and nineteenth century American precedent for lotteries,
but not for profit maximization. Part IV considers the significance of
the fact that lotteries were illegal before the development of state
lotteries. Because of that unusual circumstance, revenue-maximizing
lotteries could be introduced without depriving lottery players of
their accustomed consumer surplus and without reducing the profits
of an existing (and legal) lottery industry. Although this circumstance
is a legitimate factor in a utilitarian analysis of the optimal implicit tax
rate for a state lottery, it fails to justify revenue-maximization. The
Article concludes that the uniqueness of the states' exploitation of
lotteries puts a burden of justification on proponents of revenuemaximizing lotteries, which they almost certainly cannot carry. If
they cannot, revenue-maximizing lotteries-lotteries as we know
them-should be abandoned.
I. MAXIMIZING REVENUE AS THE GOAL OF STATE LOTTERIES

Each American lottery jurisdiction (thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia) has given itself a monopoly over lottery
gambling within its boundaries.2 One motivation for state monopolies
has been the desire to keep lotteries free of fraud and criminal
influence.3 Economies of scale may provide another rationale for a
2. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 3-4 (1999) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y3.2:G14) [hereinafter NGISC REPORT] ("To date, each state that has
authorized a lottery has granted itself a monopoly; none has seen fit to allow
competitors."); Charles T. Clotfelter et al., State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century:
Commission 24, at
Report to the National Gambling Impact Study
http://www.ngisc.gov/reports/lotfinal.pdf (Apr. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Clotfelter, Turn of
the Century] (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
3. NGISC REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4; see CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J.
COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 162 (1989) [hereinafter
CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE] ("The monopoly form appears to be a structural
response to the corruption associated with the nineteenth-century lotteries and the hint of
organized crime surrounding other kinds of gambling in which private firms are licensed to
operate."); Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at 24 ("[T]he monopoly model
appears to have worked well in keeping out unsavory elements from lottery operations.").
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lottery monopoly. Between two bets with equal expected payoffs
(i.e., jackpot amount multiplied by the odds of winning), players
generally prefer the bet with the larger jackpot and longer odds.4 By
forcing all lottery players into the same betting pool,5 a monopoly
makes it easier to offer lottery games with big jackpots.
As experience with state liquor stores and publicly-owned
utilities demonstrates,6 a government monopoly need not be operated
to produce monopoly profits. However, half of the thirty-eight
lottery jurisdictions could not be more explicit about their intent to
maximize revenues from their lottery monopolies. Lottery statutes in
nineteen states demand operation with the objective of maximizing
net revenue (or, in one case, with the purpose of generating
"continuing and increas[ing] revenue" 7), subject only to vague
constraints of consistency with the dignity of the state, the welfare of
its people, or the public good.' Lottery experts note that almost all
4. See Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that several multistate lottery consortia have been formed to make larger jackpots possible in the
participating states).
at 23.
5. See id.
6. See infratext accompanying notes 39-43 (liquor stores) and 18-24 (utilities).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-806(a) (West Supp. 2000).
8. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 5-504(B) (1995 & Supp. 1999) (requiring the lottery to be
operated "to produce the maximum amount of net revenue consonant with the dignity of
the state"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8880.25 (West 1995) (requiring the lottery to be operated
to "produce the maximum amount of net revenues"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12806(a) (West Supp. 2000) (providing that the lottery shall be "operate[d] ...in an
entrepreneurial and business-like manner" in order to "provide continuing and increased
revenue"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4801(a) (1997) (requiring the lottery to be operated
to "produce the greatest income for the State"); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 24.104(2) (Harrison
1998) (requiring the lottery to be "operated to maximize revenues in a manner consonant
with the dignity of the state and the welfare of its citizens"); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-27-2(3)
(1998) (requiring the lottery to "be operated ...in a manner which ...maximizes
revenues"); IDAHO CODE § 67-7403 (Michie 1995) (providing that "the lottery shall be
operated to produce the maximum amount of net income ... consonant with the public
good"); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-30-5-3 (Michie 1996) (requiring "operat[ion of] the lottery to
maximize revenues in a manner consistent with the dignity of the state and the welfare of
its citizens"); IOWA CODE § 99E.9(1) (1996 & Supp. 2000) (requiring the lottery to be
operated "to produce the maximum amount of net revenues for the state in a manner
which maintains the dignity of the state and the general welfare of the people"); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 154A.060(1) (Michie 1996) (requiring the lottery to be operated to "result in
maximization of revenues"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:9009(A) (West Supp. 2000)
(requiring the lottery to be operated so as to "result in maximization of revenues to the
state," while maintaining "the dignity of the state and the general welfare of its citizens");
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.969(9)(1) (Michie 1999) (requiring the lottery to be operated to
"produce the maximum amount of net revenues for the state consonant with the general
welfare of the people"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-7-202(3) (1999) (directing the lottery
commission to "maximize the net revenue paid to the state ... and ensure that all policies
and rules adopted further revenue maximization"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:9-7(a) (West
1996) (requiring the lottery to be operated to "produce the maximum amount of net
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5

other lottery states differ only in the lack of an express statement of
their profit-maximizing purpose.9
Although there are significant differences among the states in
their implicit lottery tax rates (i.e., lottery profits as a percentage of
prizes plus operating expenses), 10 the variation seems to be based on
differences in operating expenses" and in real or perceived
differences in consumer demand in different states,12 and not on
different goals. In the past few years, there has been a trend toward
higher payouts (and lower implicit taxes), but it has been driven by
changes in demand resulting from increasing competition from
3
neighboring state lotteries and from other forms of gambling.
Recent lower implicit tax rates are simply a continuation of the
attempt to maximize profits, albeit under less favorable conditions.
The exceptions to revenue-maximizing lottery operations do not
relate to implicit tax levels, but to severe restrictions on lottery
revenues ...consonant with the dignity of the State and the general welfare of the
people"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-24-7(B) (Michie 1999) (instructing the lottery board to
"maximize the net revenue" and to "assure that all rules, policies and procedures adopted
further revenue maximization"); OR. REv. STAT. § 461.200 (1997) (requiring the lottery
"to be operated as to produce the maximum amount of net revenues ... commensurate
with the public good"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-7A-24 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 2000)
(directing the lottery commission to "maximize the net proceeds to the state from the sale
of instant and on-line lottery tickets"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 67.70.040(1) (West
1985 & Supp. 2000) (requiring the lottery to be operated to "produce the maximum
amount of net revenues for the state consonant with the dignity of the state and the
general welfare of the people"); W. VA. CODE § 29-22-9(a) (1999) (requiring the lottery to
"be operated so as to produce the maximum amount of net revenues ... consonant with
the public good").
9. Writing in 1989, Clotfelter and Cook stated that "revenue maximization is close to
a universal goal" of state lotteries. CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3,
at 168. Ten years later they and their co-authors reported that nothing had changed: "In
virtually all states, the operational answer to [the question of the ultimate objective of a
lottery] has been that the lottery should be run so as to maximize revenue." Clotfelter,
Turn of the Century,supra note 2, at 21; see also John F. Scoggins, The Lotto and Expected
Net Revenue, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 61, 69 (1995) ("[S]tate lottery agencies are supposed to
maximize profits.").
10. Implicit tax data for all thirty-eight lottery jurisdictions for fiscal year 1997 is set
forth in Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at tbl. 3. According to this table, five
jurisdictions have implicit tax rates greater than 60% (the highest is Pennsylvania at
67.8%); five have rates between 50% and 60%; fourteen are between 40% and 50%; eight
are between 30% and 40%; and six are below 30% (the lowest is Idaho at 25.6%). I&
11. Operating expenses as a percentage of revenues tend to be higher in smaller
states. Id. at 7.
12. See id. (citing evidence of much greater demand for lottery products in
Massachusetts than in neighboring Vermont).
13. Id. at 28. In other words, the strength of the lottery monopoly is weakened by the
increasing availability of imperfect substitutes-other forms of gambling within the
jurisdiction and the same form of gambling in nearby jurisdictions.
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advertising in a very small number of states. In contrast to the
standard use of aggressive lottery advertising "to stimulate rather
than merely accommodate demand,"' 4 Virginia law prohibits the
lottery from expending funds "for the primary purpose of inducing
persons to participate in the lottery." 5 Wisconsin similarly prohibits
the use of public funds for promotional (as distinguished from merely
informational) lottery advertising.' 6 The Minnesota statute is slightly
less restrictive. It permits promotion of the lottery as entertainment,
but not as a means of relieving financial difficulties or as an
investment." Other lottery states have some statutory restrictions on
the nature of lottery advertising, but only of the sort that might be
imposed on private advertisers as a means of consumer protection.
Only in Virginia, Wisconsin, and Minnesota are the restrictions
severe enough to suggest that the state is seriously restricting the
revenue potential of its lottery.
II. STATES' FAILURE TO MAXIMIZE REVENUE FROM OTHER
PRODUCTS

Utilities and Other Government Monopolies
Despite the theoretical potential for monopoly pricing by
government-owned utilities, in practice such behavior is at least
extremely rare, and probably non-existent. Local governments
commonly have monopolies over water supplies and sewers, for
example, but they never try to maximize revenues from those utilities.
Governing statutes typically require water and sewer authorities to fix
their rates at the level necessary to cover operating and maintenance
expenses (including debt service and reserves for depreciation and
contingencies). 8 Electrical utilities owned by local governments are
somewhat less common, but their prices are also set to cover their
costs rather than to earn monopoly profits. 19 The same is true of the
A.

14. CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 11. For good discussions
of typical lottery advertising practices, see id. at 186-212; ALAN J. KARCHER, LOTrERIES
72-88 (1989); Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REv. 11, 60-63 (1992); Clotfelter,
Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at 18-23.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4022(E) (Michie 1997).
16. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 565.32(1) (West 1998). The statute does, however, permit
promotional advertising by retailers and vendors. Id. § 565.32(2).
17. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 349A.09.2 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000).
18. See, e.g., 42 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1196-d(20) (McKinney 1994) (requiring
expense-based pricing).
19. See, e.g., Hearde v. City of Seattle, 611 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
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two federally-established power suppliers, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) and the Bonneville Power Authority (BPA).20
The oldest and most prominent federal monopoly is the United
States Postal Service (USPS). Federal law requires the USPS to
charge postage rates "in the public interest," rather than in the
interest of profits. 21 The statutory directives to the Postal Rate
Commission call for a "fair and equitable [rate] schedule," with "each
class of mail ... bear[ing] the direct and indirect postal costs ... plus
that portion of all other costs ... reasonably assignable." '
Government-owned mass transit is something of a special case.
Typically transit authorities do not follow the standard utility costbased pricing model. Instead, they charge fares so low that their
revenues are well below costs, with the difference made up by general

tax revenues. 23
In short, the dominant model for government monopolies is costbased pricing, with pricing below cost the only common alternative
model. As two leading experts on public enterprises have noted,
"[P]ublic enterprise in the [United States] has a strong tradition of
being nonprofit[,] making behavior like that of a pure monopolist
unlikely."2 4

B. Alcohol Excise Taxes and State Liquor Stores
A recent study of state taxes on alcohol found a wide range of
tax burdens, across both different states and different beverages.
State tax revenues from beer ranged from $1 to $30 per proof gallon,
(holding that a state statute requiring rates charged by utilities to be "just, fair, reasonable
and sufficient" applied to a government-owned power company).
20. With respect to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), see 16 U.S.C. § 831k
(1994) (mandating that when TVA sells power to a for-profit utility, the utility must agree
that it will re-sell to consumers at prices which are "reasonable, just and fair") and 16
U.S.C. § 831j (1994) (mandating that TVA policy is to "permit domestic and rural use at
the lowest possible rates"). With respect to the Bonneville Power Authority (BPA), see
16 U.S.C. § 832e (1994) (mandating that rates "shall be fixed and established with a view
to encouraging the widest possible diversified use of electric energy") and 16 U.S.C. § 832f
(1994) (mandating that rates shall be set to allow the recovery of costs of production and
transmission).
21. 39 U.S.C. § 3622(a) (1994) (requiring the USPS to ask the Postal Rate
Commission for permission to change rates when a change "would be in the public
interest").
22. 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b)(1), (3).
23. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.95.010 (West 1985 & Supp. 2000)
(authorizing Washington municipalities to use tax revenues to subsidize their transit
systems).
24. MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION 153 (1986).
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with fifteen states below $7 and fifteen above $105 For wine,
revenues ranged from $2 to $24 per proof gallon, with sixteen states
below $8 and twenty-two above $116 Distilled spirits were the most
heavily taxed, with a range of $5 to $30.27 Eighteen states were below
$11 and twenty were above $151 This great variation in rates
suggests that states are not generally trying to maximize alcohol tax
9 Although the revenue-maximizing alcohol excise tax rate
revenue.?
no doubt varies somewhat from state to state based on differences in
demand, it seems unlikely that states attempting to maximize tax
revenues would arrive at such widely varying rates. Results from
econometric studies also suggest that states are not attempting to
maximize alcohol tax revenue. A recent survey of studies of the price
elasticity of demand for alcohol concludes that "[t]he best estimates
today imply that a 10-percent increase in the alcohol tax rate
probably would increase the amount of tax revenues collected,
although by less than 10 percent."3
A 1997 study of the effect of the 1991 federal alcohol excise tax
increase on alcohol sales in nine selected states provides additional
evidence that states are generally below the revenue-maximizing tax
rates on alcohol." For each major form of alcohol (beer, wine, and
distilled spirits), the study examined sales in a low tax, a moderate
tax, and a high tax state. In only one of the nine cases studied (beer
in high tax Hawaii) did the federal excise tax increase lead to a
permanent decline in sales.32 This finding implies that in the other
eight cases the states could increase alcohol tax rates without
significantly decreasing sales; increased taxes would thus result in
increased revenues. 33

25. See RICHARD MCGOWAN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ALCOHOL
INDUSTRY: THE SEARCH FOR REVENUE AND THE COMMON GOOD 115 tbl. 7.1 (1997).
26. See id. at 117 tbl. 7.3.
27. See id. at 116 tbl. 7.2.
28. See id.
29. The variations are much larger than the variations in the implicit tax rates of state
lotteries. See Clotfeler, Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at 28 tbl. 3.
30. Donald Kenkel & Willard Manning, Perspectives on Alcohol Taxation, 20
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 230, 234-35 (1996). Kenkel and Manning explain
that "[a] more precise estimate is difficult to calculate ... because no consensus exists on
exactly how responsive alcohol demand is to price." Id. at 235.
31. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 121-30.
32. Id. at 123-30.
33. McGowan states (perhaps with pun intended) that alcohol's "full potential as a
source of revenue has not been tapped," particularly with respect to beer and wine. Id. at
118.
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At the very least, then, the states have good reason to suspect
that they have not fully exploited the tax potential of alcohol; they
should experiment with increased rates if revenue maximization is
their goal. Yet, there have been virtually no changes in state alcohol
tax rates over the past five years, and the little movement that has
occurred has been in the direction of lower rates. 34
The story is much the same at the federal level.3 The most
recent legislation increasing federal alcohol excise taxes was passed in
1990.36 Although the legislative history of that increase indicates
definite interest in the expected revenue, nothing suggests that
Congress was attempting to find the revenue-maximizing rate.37 Two
years later, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that Congress
could raise $23.5 billion over five years by increasing the federal
3
excise tax rate to $16 per proof gallon for all alcoholic beverages.
Despite the interest in deficit reduction in the early 1990s, Congress
failed to act on this opportunity to increase revenue.
In addition to excise taxes, governments might attempt to
maximize revenue from alcohol by giving themselves sales
monopolies and then pricing so as to extract monopoly profits.
Although a few states do limit the sale of some kinds of alcoholic

beverages to state liquor stores, states do not generally attempt to use
their liquor store monopolies to maximize profits. To the contrary,
34. See Mandy Rafool, State Tax Actions 1999, 18 ST. TAX NOTES 919, 923 (2000)
(reporting an increase in the Illinois liquor tax, small alcohol tax decreases in two other
states, and no changes in the rest of the country); Judy Zelio et al., State Tax Actions 1998,
16 ST. TAX NOTES 1039,1044 (1999) (reporting that the only 1998 changes in alcohol taxes
were minor reductions in two states); Judy Zelio, State Tax Actions 1997, 14 ST. TAX
NOTES 1005, 1009 (1998) (reporting that the only 1997 change in state alcohol taxation
was a reduction in a scheduled increase in the Washington state beer tax); Scott R.
Mackey, State Tax Actions 1996, 11 ST. TAX NOTES 1461, 1465 (1996) ("For the third
consecutive year, state alcoholic beverage tax changes were negligible.").
35. Federal alcohol excise taxation in the years immediately following the repeal of
Prohibition is discussed infra text accompanying notes 146-153.
36. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 11201, 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-415 to 1388-419 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5001(a)(1) (1994) (distilled
spirits), 5041(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (wine), and 5051(a)(1) (1994) (beer)).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 279-80 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017,
2281-82 (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:101-881). Actually, the legislative history suggests that
non-revenue concerns were at least as significant as revenue concerns in justifying the
increase: "[I]ncreasing the alcoholic beverage excise taxes could help to place some of the
costs of alcohol consumption on alcohol users and could reduce consumption among
teenagers." Id. at 280, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2282 (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:
101-881).
38. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 102D CONG., ISSUES INVOLVED IN
POSSIBLE REVENUE OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE FEDERAL DEFICIT 29 (Comm. Print
1992).
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statements of legislative purpose commonly invoke "protection of the
public welfare, health, peace and morals," or some very similar
formulation.3 9 Some statutes explicitly insist on a sumptuary model,
in which the state is careful not to stimulate demand. Utah's statute,

for example, calls for state liquor store pricing designed to
"reasonably satisfy the public demand and protect the public
interest,"40 and prohibits state stores from "promot[ing] or
41
encourag[ing] sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages." Idaho
decrees that the state liquor store agency "shall not attempt to
stimulate the normal demands of temperate consumers ...
irrespective of the effect on the revenue derived by the state from the
resale of intoxicating liquor."'4 2
New Hampshire is the lone exception to the general rule that
states do not seek to maximize profits on the sale of alcoholic
beverages. The New Hampshire statute directs the liquor commission
to operate liquor stores in such a way as to "maximize their
profitability."'43 This is indeed the same revenue maximization goal
pursued by state lotteries, and it makes the justification of the New
Hampshire lottery a special case. While every other lottery state
must explain why the lottery product is uniquely appropriate for
revenue maximization, New Hampshire must explain why only the
lottery and those alcoholic beverages over which the state claims a
monopoly should be exploited for their full revenue potential. In the

39. The quoted language appears in both the Alabama and Pennsylvania statutes.
ALA. CODE § 28-3-2(a) (1986); 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-104(a) (West 1997). Four
other state statutes include very similar language. MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-1-101(3)
(1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-103 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1 (1999); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 66.08.010 (West 1985 & Supp. 2000).
40. UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-104(3) (1999).
41. Id. Oregon law forbids advertising and window displays by state liquor stores.
OR. REV. STAT. § 471.750 (1997). A Washington statute provides that net annual revenue
from state liquor stores is not to exceed 35% of gross sales. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 66-16.010(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 2000). The detailed pricing instructions in the North
Carolina statute give no indications of an intent to maximize profits. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-804(b) (1999).
42. IDAHO CODE § 23-203 (Michie 1995).
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177:3(11) (1994). Lest the point be missed, another
statute provides that one of the "primary duties" of the liquor commission is to
"[o]ptimize the profitability of the commission." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176:3(I) (1994).
The Maine laws governing state liquor stores call for a profit-maximizing (rather than
sumptuary) model of operation, but only for two specified stores catering primarily to outof-state customers. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 201 (West 1988) (directing the
Maine Turnpike Authority to put up an advertising sign for the Kittery discount liquor
store, "[i]n order to increase state revenues and to attract more of the tourist trade"); id.
§ 403 (authorizing discount liquor stores at two specified locations).
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end this may simply mean that New Hampshire has two unjustifiable
practices rather than one.
Whether the focus is on state excise taxes, federal excise taxes, or
state retail monopolies, the bottom line is the same. Governments in
the United States (with the exception of maverick New Hampshire)
make no attempt to maximize tax revenues or government profits
from the sale of alcoholic beverages.
C. Excise Taxes on Tobacco Products
In sharp contrast to the many statements of profit-maximizing
purpose in lottery legislation, no state has an announced policy of
attempting to maximize excise tax revenue from cigarettes and other
tobacco products. There is tremendous variation in state cigarette
excise tax rates, from a low of 2.5 cents per pack in Virginia 44 to a high
of $1.11 per pack in New York 45 (followed closely by $1 per pack in
Alaska and Hawaii 46) with a median rate of 34 cents per pack.47 Even
the states with the highest rates do not appear to be maximizing their
tax revenue, either in terms of purpose or result. As was expected,
Alaska's 345% tax rate increase (from 29 cents to $1 per pack) in
1997 has resulted in only a 13% decrease in sales. 48 Tobacco tax
revenues for the first full year of Alaska's new tax rate have been
estimated at $49.8 million-more than triple the $13.7 million for the
last full year of the old rate.49 With such a favorable revenue impact
from this increase, if Alaska's goal were revenue maximization the
obvious next step would be to experiment with additional rate
increases, until the state locates the revenue-maximizing rate by trialand-error. 50 But Alaska has not increased its cigarette tax in the three
years since 1997.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1001 (Michie 1997).
45. N.Y. TAX LAW § 471 (McKinney 1999).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 43.50.090(a) (Michie 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 245-3(a)(1)(B)
(1999).
47. Cigarette tax rates for all fifty states (and the District of Columbia) are compiled
by the Federation of Tax Administrators, and they are available on the Federation's Web
site, http:llwww.taxadmin.orglftalrate/cigarett.html.
48. See Bob Tkacz, DOR: With Higher Cigarette Tax, Sales are Down, Revenues Up,
15 ST. TAX NOTES 588,588 (1998).
49. See id.
50. Alaska's geographic isolation probably makes it less susceptible than most states
to the smuggling of cigarettes from neighboring low tax jurisdictions, so that increased
rates might cause smaller reductions in sales than in other states more vulnerable to
smuggling. The same is likely true of Hawaii.
It is theoretically possible that the top of the "Laffer curve" (i.e., the revenuemaximizing tax rate) is somewhere between 29 cents and $1 per pack, so that the new tax
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In 1998 California voters narrowly approved Proposition 10,
51
raising the state's cigarette tax from 37 to 87 cents per pack. The
voters who approved Proposition 10 were given no reason to believe
they were voting to maximize cigarette tax revenue. Although the
purpose was to raise revenue to fund early childhood development
programs-the official revenue estimate for the tax increase was over
$700 million annually 5 2 -the proponents gave no indication that the
87 cents rate was designed to maximize revenue. Nothing in either
the text of Proposition 10 or in the supporting argument in the official
California voter's guide gave any indication of how the size of the tax
increase was chosen. 3 The rate probably reflected a political
judgment as to the largest increase that could win voter approval.
Given the narrowness of the victory, that judgment proved
remarkably astute. If the revenue forecasts for Proposition 10 prove
reasonably accurate, that will suggest that the forty-six states with
lower-in most cases, much lower-rates are not maximizing their
cigarette tax revenue (at least unless they face substantially higher
54
price elasticities of demand for cigarettes than does California).
Most recently, New York more than doubled its cigarette tax55
from 55 cents to $1.11 per pack-effective March 1, 2000. The
purpose of the tax increase was to generate $400 million of additional

rate is somewhat above the revenue-maximizing rate. That result was certainly not the
intent, however, and in any event the huge increase in revenue suggests that if the new
rate overshoots the revenue-maximizing rate, it does not do so by very much.
51. California Children and Families Act of 1998, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 130100 (West 2000). The margin of approval was less than one percent of the total votes
cast. See Carol Ingram, Cigarette Tax Measure Wins Close Race, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1998, at A3.
52. California Secretary of State, Vote 98, at http://Vote98.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/
Propositions/10.htm (last visited Nov. 11,2000) (official voter guide).
53. Rob Reiner, California Proposition 10 Would Increase Tobacco Tax, 1998 ST.
TAX TODAY 183-2, Sept, 22, 1998, passim, at LEXIS, LEXSTAT 98 STN 183-2. (offering
no explanation of how the tax rate was chosen); California Secretary of State, supra note
52 (presenting the argument by proponents of Proposition 10).
54. This assumes that at 87 cents per pack California is not above the revenuemaximizing tax rate. See supra note 50. Although a state might intentionally impose a
cigarette tax above the revenue-maximizing level-thus elevating the goal of discouraging
smoking over the goal of raising revenue-that clearly was not the purpose behind
Proposition 10. The California voter's guide explains Proposition 10 solely as a revenueraising measure, and not as a device for discouraging smoking by increasing its cost.
California Secretary of State, supra note 52 (noting that some of the revenues will be spent
on anti-smoking education, but saying nothing about the behavioral effect of the tax
itself). Because a rate above the revenue-maximizing level would mean less money for
childhood development programs and a greater likelihood of defeat at the polls, it
certainly would not have been selected intentionally.
55. N.Y. TAX LAW § 471 (McKinney 1999).
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annual revenue to finance expanded health care coverage for the
uninsured.5 6 It is unclear whether the New York legislature was
aiming for the revenue-maximizing tax rate, but given the revenuedriven nature of the increase it is clear that the goal was not to raise
the tax rate above the revenue-maximizing level. If New York is right
that $1.11 is not above the revenue-maximizing rate, then every other
state must be below the revenue-maximizing rate (again, with the
possible exception of a state facing a significantly higher price
elasticity of demand for cigarettes than New York).
The recent cigarette sales in Alaska, and the California and New
York revenue predictions, reflect short run elasticities of demand. 57
With an addictive product such as cigarettes, demand elasticities may
be much greater in the long run than in the short run. The leading
study of cigarette demand elasticities indicates "that the long-run
price elasticity is almost twice as large as the short-run price
elasticity."5 Because smoking is addictive, consumption of cigarettes
in any given year is positively related to consumption levels in
previous years. When a tax increase reduces consumption in the first
year of the increase, that reduction causes "consumption in ... all
future years to fall." 9 As a result, the long run revenue-maximizing
rate will be substantially lower than the short run revenuemaximizing rate.
Although the evidence from Alaska, California, and New York
suggests that all (or nearly all) states are below their short run
revenue-maximizing rates, perhaps some states are at, or even above,
their long run revenue-maximizing rates.' A 1994 econometric study
by David Merriman investigates and strongly rejects this possibility. 61
Using the best available estimates of the long run price elasticity of
56. Raymond Hernandez, New York Raising Tax on Cigarettes to Help Uninsured,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1999, at Al.
57. See RICHARD MCGOWAN, BUSINESS, POLITICS AND CIGARETTES 100-04 (1995).
McGowan studied the revenue effects of recent tax increases in three moderately high
cigarette tax states-Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Washington. Id. In each case he
found that the short run result was a significant increase in tax revenue. Il
58. Gary S. Becker et al., An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 396,397 (1994).
59. Id. at 397.
60. James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee have hypothesized that elected officials,
acting rationally but with an interest only in short term revenue effects, might select
commodity tax rates which maximize short term revenue, but which exceed the long term
revenue-maximizing rates. James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Tax Rates and Tax
Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 344, 346

(1982).
61. David Merriman, Do Cigarette Excise Tax Rates Maximize Revenue?, 32 ECON.
INQUIRY 419,428 (1994).
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demand for cigarettes, Merriman found that "in all states, the
62
cigarette excise tax rate is far below the revenue-maximizing rate."
In fact, "[e]ven if long-run cigarette consumption was twice as
sensitive to changes in price as... empirical results suggest, all states'
marginal revenues [from a permanent one-cent per pack tax increase]
would be positive."'63 Even if large tax increases subsequent to
Merriman's study may have made this less certain in a few states,
there is no evidence that any state has ever intentionally maximized
64
revenue (either short run or long run) from cigarette excise taxes.
Revenue maximization has also never been the goal of the
federal cigarette tax. Pursuant to 1997 legislation, the federal rate
rose from 24 to 34 cents per pack on January 1, 2000, and is scheduled
to rise to 39 cents in 2002.65 Even the 39 cents rate is far below
economists' estimates of the long-term revenue-maximizing federal
66
rate, which are in the neighborhood of $1 per pack. The untapped
federal revenue potential is also indicated by the Treasury
Department's estimate that a 1999 Clinton administration proposal to
increase the tax to 94 cents per pack would raise federal tax revenues
by $34 billion over a five-year period.67 Despite the consensus of the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 427.
64. The most significant change in state cigarette taxes since Merriman's study is not
officially a tax at all. The 1998 $206 billion settlement between the leading cigarette
manufacturers and forty-six states is the functional equivalent of an excise tax of 35 to 40
cents per pack. Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers Announce Large Price Rise, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1998, at A20. If this happened to put a few states at or near revenue
maximization, it would have been an accident. For a detailed critique of the tobacco
settlement as a tax, see Jane G. Gravelle, Burning Issues in the Tobacco Settlement
Payments: An Economic Perspective,51 NAT'L TAX J. 437 passim (1998).
65. 26 U.S.C. § 5701(b)(1) (1994), amended by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.
105-33 § 9302(a), 111 Stat. 251, 671 (1997) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
No.
L.
§ 5701(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
66. For the only thoroughly reported study on this question, see John D. Jackson &
Richard P. Saba, Some Limits on Taxing Sin: Cigarette Taxation and Health Care Finance,
63 S. ECON. J. 761, 773 ("[T]he revenue maximizing federal tax per pack on cigarettes is
$1.10."). Two leading authors on the long-run price elasticity of demand for cigarettes
have reported without detailed explanation different revenue-maximizing federal tax rates,
based on data from their study. Compare Gary S. Becker, Warning: A Cigarette Tax May
be Hazardous to Health Financing,Bus. WK., Aug. 15, 1994, at 18 (95 cents per pack),
with Michael Grossman, For Best Revenue, Tax Cigarettes $1.26, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1993, at A26.
67. See Treasury Releases Explanationof Administration's2000 Budget Proposal,1999
TAX NOTES TODAY 21-36, Feb. 2, 1999, 774, at LEXIS, LEXSTAT 1999 TNT 21-36.
Although this might approximate, or even exceed, the long-term revenue-maximizing rate,
the Treasury does not cite revenue maximization as a goal. Rather, it explains the
proposal as a way of compensating the federal government for its "tobacco-related health
care costs." Id. at 773. The revenue-based justification indicates that the rate is not
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experts that current rates leave considerable room for revenue-raising
rate increases, Congress has not yet even approached the revenuemaximizing rate. 68
The states and the federal government have imposed heavy tax
burdens on cigarettes and other tobacco products, but extracting
every possible dollar out of tobacco users has never been the goal.
The contrast with the standard revenue-maximizing approach to
lotteries is evidenced not only by the tax rates, but also by other antismoking laws. If the states were determined to make as much money
as possible from cigarettes, they would not have enacted laws
prohibiting smoking in so many public places. 69 By the same token, a
federal government out to maximize cigarette tax revenue would not
have prohibited cigarette advertising on television and radio.7" In
both tax and non-tax laws, the states and Congress have
demonstrated that government policy toward smoking cannot be

summed up as one of revenue maximization. The difference from
lottery policy is clear.
D. Vanity License Plates
Every state permits vehicle owners to buy "vanity" (or, less
pejoratively, "personalized") license plates, with the alphanumeric
combination chosen by the owner. Fees vary greatly from state to
state. More expensive states include Alabama ($50 annual fee),
Delaware ($40 annual fee), and Texas ($40 annual fee).71 Good
bargains can be found in Virginia ($10 annual fee), Florida ($10
annual fee and $2 one-time processing fee), and Pennsylvania ($20
one-time fee).72
designed, at least, to be above the revenue-maximizing level.
68. All of the experts' estimates predate the quasi-tax increase from the states'
tobacco settlement described supra note 64. The settlement would lower the revenuemaximizing federal rate to some extent, but the rate would remain well above the
statutory rate (starting in 2002) of 39 cents. The 35 to 40 cents quasi-tax of the settlement
would not use up all the room between the 39 cents federal rate and the estimated
revenue-maximizing rate of $1.
69. According to the American Cancer Society, as of 1996 there were laws in fortynine states and the District of Columbia restricting or prohibiting smoking in public places.
AM. CANCER SOC'Y, QUESTIONs ABOUT SMOKING, TOBACCO AND HEALTH 11 (1996).
Among the most sweeping restrictions are CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19994.30-19994.35 (West
1995) (banning smoking in all buildings open to the public), and N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE
§ 17-501 to 17-504 (McKinney 1994) (banning smoking in almost all places of employment,
including larger restaurants).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
71. ALA. CODE § 32-6-150(a) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 2121(h) (1995); TEx.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 502.251(c) (Vernon 1999).
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.0805(2) (West 1990); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1931 (1996);
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It is not clear how many states, if any, intend vanity plate fees to
raise as much revenue as possible from a flat-fee system. In striking
contrast to the common directions for revenue maximization in
lottery statutes, no vanity plate statute indicates such a purpose. The
extent of the variation in fees suggests that at least some states are not
close to the profit-maximizing fee, although a universal intent to
maximize profits would not necessarily, or even probably, result in
identical fees in all states.7 3 Different states might believe, rightly or
wrongly, that they faced different price elasticities of demand for the
product.
An econometric study of vanity plate pricing in forty-three states
and the District of Columbia demonstrated that in twenty-one of the
forty-four jurisdictions, fees were substantially below the revenuemaximizing level.7 4 This study reveals little, however, about intent.
Some jurisdictions close to the revenue-maximizing fee may not have
intended to maximize revenues, and other jurisdictions may have
accidentally set fees too low while attempting to make as much
money as possible. Mistake is the only plausible explanation for the
eleven jurisdictions, which charged fees substantially above the
revenue-maximizing level. 75
In any event, speculation about the revenue-maximizing flat fee
is somewhat beside the point, because no flat-fee system can
maximize profits from the sale of vanity plates. The way to maximize
revenue from vanity plates is to auction off each alphanumeric
combination desired by any vehicle owner. An auction enables the
state to take advantage of the fact that each plate is a different
product, subject to different demand.76 Although no American
jurisdiction auctions vanity plates, auctions have been tremendously
lucrative for Hong Kong, raising $80 million since 1973. 77 One plate
sold for almost $2 million in 1994, and another for $1.3 million in

VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-726 (Michie 1998).
73. As with alcohol, the variations in vanity plate fees are much larger than the
variations in the implicit tax rates of state lotteries. See Clotfelter, Turn of the Century,
supra note 2, at 2829 tbl. 3 (reporting implicit tax rates of state lotteries); supra text
accompanying notes 25-30 (describing variations in alcohol tax rates).
74. Neil 0. Alper et al., At What Price Vanity?: An Econometric Model of the
Demandfor PersonalizedLicense Plates,40 NAT'L TAX J. 103, 107-08 (1987).

75. See id.
76. Although the authors of the econometric pricing study note that "[i]n the eyes of
the consumer not all personalized plates license plates are equal," they do not consider the
possibility of auctions. Id. at 103.
77. Rone Tempest, In Hong Kong, Health, Wealth PAID4 with Big Money, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at A2.
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1993.78 The only way to purchase a particular vanity plate in Hong
Kong is to request that it be put on the auction list, and then to
79
prevail at auction (with the minimum bid set at $260).

When vanity plates were introduced, it is possible that the failure
of states to sell by auction reflected either a simple failure of
imagination, or a belief that auctions were logistically impossible in a
geographically large state (although that would not explain Rhode
Island or the District of Columbia). Hong Kong's example has solved
the former problem, and the internet has solved the latter, but still no

state has adopted auction sales of vanity plates. Without auctions, no
state is making a serious attempt to realize monopoly profits from the
sale of vanity plates.
E.

FederalCommunications Commission Spectrum Auctions
Since 1994, the federal government has attempted to maximize

revenue from its control over the radio spectrum by selling nonbroadcast spectrum licenses at auctions conducted by the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC). 0 Although non-broadcast
spectrum auctions share the revenue-maximizing goal of lotteries,
there is a crucial difference. While lotteries are designed to extract

the maximum revenue from lottery consumers, spectrum auctions are
designed to extract as much money as possible from the producers of
personal communications services. Whether the producer receives a
free spectrum license from the government or purchases it at auction,

thereafter the cost (if any) of obtaining the license is fixed for the
producer. The price to the consumer of personal communications
services will be a function of the producer's marginal cost curve.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The auctions were authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
§ 6002, 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (1994). The FCC held the first auction on July 25, 1994, and in
less than two years auction revenues exceeded $20 billion. See Federal Communications
Commission press release, FCC Hits $20 Billion Mark in Total Auction Revenues, at
www.fcc.gov/BureauslWireless/News Releases/nrwl60l5.txt (Apr. 5, 1996) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). For an excellent discussion of the issues surrounding
spectrum auctions, see generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio
Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529
(1998).
Congress has not, however, adopted a consistent policy of revenue maximization
in the allocation of spectrum rights. Broadcast incumbents were given high-definition
television (HDTV) licenses at no charge, and broadcast license renewals are not subject to
the auction procedure. Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 3002(a)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j)(1), (2)(b) (Supp. IV 1998) (authorizing auctions of radio and television licenses,
but exempting HDTV licenses and all license renewals); Telecommunications Act of 1996
§ 201,47 U.S.C. § 336 (Supp. IV 1998) (HDTV).
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Thus the cost to the consumer will be the same whether the producer
received the license as a windfall or paid dearly for it. Replacing
license giveaways with auctions reduces producer profits; it does not
increase cost to the consumer. 81 Even after the 1994 introduction of
spectrum license auctions, it remains true that only in the case of
lotteries is it standard government practice to wring as much money
as possible from the consumers of a particular product.'m
III. UNSUCCESSFUL JUSTIFICATION ATTEMPTS

A.

An Efficient Tax?
1. Standard Efficiency Analysis

The basic economic objection to a tax on any activity is that the
tax creates an efficiency loss to the extent the tax discourages people
from engaging in the activity.83 The magnitude of the efficiency loss
depends on the elasticity of the demand for the activity. At one
extreme, a tax on an activity for which the demand is perfectly
inelastic would have no effect on behavior, and would therefore
create no efficiency loss. If lottery gambling were completely
unresponsive to the size of the implicit tax, it would be an appropriate
target for revenue maximization from an efficiency standpoint
(although the tax might still be objectionable on distributional
Less fancifully, if gambling were less elastic than
grounds).
alternative objects of taxation, a revenue-maximizing lottery might be
chosen for its low efficiency cost.

81. See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1,
22-23 (1959) (noting that the effect of de facto sales of broadcast licenses, in connection
with the sale of radio and television stations, "is, of course, to reduce the return by the new
owners to (or at any rate nearer to) the competitive level").
82. It is standard government practice, of course, to sell seized and forfeited property
at auction, and these sales-of cars, for example-are often made directly to the
consumer. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (authorizing auction
sales of property forfeited pursuant to federal drug laws); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-13 (1999)
(authorizing sheriffs and police departments to sell seized property at auction); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 18B-504(f) (1999) (authorizing auction sale of property used to transport non-tax
paid alcoholic beverages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.3(g) (1999) (authorizing auction sale
of vehicles raced on streets). These auction sales, however, make the government only a
casual and very small seller in the used car market (for example); they hardly represent a
government attempt to extract as much revenue as possible from the universe of
consumers of used cars.
83. This is apart from the possibility of Pigovian taxation, designed to further
efficiency goals in response to concerns about the negative externalities of the taxed
activity. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
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The efficiency case for a revenue-maximizing lottery, however, is
unproven and implausible. In 1987, Clotfelter and Cook compared
the implicit tax on state lotteries with excise tax rates on alcohol and

tobacco4 The average lottery tax rate of 46% 81 was substantially
higher than the average rates for liquor (30%), wine (13%), beer
(12%), and tobacco products (33%).86 This difference could be
justified on efficiency grounds only if the demand for lottery products
were substantially less elastic than the demand for alcohol and
tobacco. Although Clotfelter and Cook do not attempt an empirical
study of relative elasticities, they note that a substantially lower
elasticity for lotteries seems unlikely.' The burden should be on
advocates of revenue-maximizing lotteries to prove the unusually low
elasticity of lottery demand, but there has been no attempt to do so.
More recently, William W. Rodgers and Charles Stuart have
examined the efficiency question by comparing the lottery tax not to

other excise taxes, but to an increase in the tax on labor income.8
They consider, as an alternative to a revenue-maximizing lottery, an
untaxed lottery plus an increase in the tax on wages sufficient to make
up for the loss in lottery revenues. 9 They find "that under a wide

range of assumptions, the labor tax is more efficient than the lottery
tax as a source of marginal public revenue." 90
These results are not surprising. Revenue lotteries were
introduced because they were politically feasible, not because studies
indicated they were more efficient than other ways of raising the same
amount of revenue. The surprise would have been if there was an

84. Charles T. Clotfelter & Philip J. Cook, Implicit Taxation in Lottery Finance, 40

NAT'LTAxJ. 533,543(1987) [hereinafter Clotfelter & Cook, Implicit Taxation].
85. Id at 543. This was the tax-inclusive rate, i.e., for every dollar gambled in a
lottery, the states took 41 cents and the federal income tax burden averaged 5 cents. The
tax-exclusive rate-the implicit tax as a percentage of the pre-tax cost of the product-was
an impressive 85%. Id. at 544.
86. Id. at 543. In a recent follow-up study, Clotfelter, Cook and co-authors noted that
the difference in tax rates is less dramatic today. Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supra
note 2, at 7-10. Excise tax rates on alcohol and tobacco have risen (especially on tobacco,
see discussion supra text accompanying notes 48-70), and the implicit tax-exclusive rate on
lotteries has fallen from 85% to about 61%. (The decrease was due to changes in
consumer demand, not to abandonment of the goal of revenue maximization.) They note,
however, that lottery tax rates remain "quite high compared to tax rates on other
commodities that states tax, such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco products." Id.
87. See Clotfelter & Cook, Implicit Taxation, supra note 84, at 543.
88. See William W. Rodgers & Charles Stuart, The Efficiency of a Lottery as a Source
of PublicRevenue, 23 PUB. FIN. Q. 242 passim (1995).

89. Id. at 243.
90. Id. at 252.
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efficiency case for revenue-maximizing lotteries as causing an
especially small amount of distortion.
Both efficiency studies of the lottery tax point out that the
introduction of even a highly-taxed lottery produces an efficiency
gain-improves consumer welfare-compared with an alternative of
no lottery. 91

A revenue-maximizing

lottery is an efficiency

improvement, however, only compared to the state-created
alternative of no legal lotteries. If the universe of policy options
includes-as it should-a less heavily taxed lottery with the lost
revenue recouped by an increase in other excise taxes or in wage
taxes, there is no efficiency case based on low distortion to be made
for a revenue-maximizing lottery.
2. A Pigovian Tax?
A different kind of efficiency analysis is used in support of some
taxes. This analysis justifies a tax not because it causes little change in
behavior relative to the no-tax alternative, but because it induces
efficient changes in behavior compared with the no-tax world. These
taxes are sometimes referred to as Pigovian taxes, after A. C. Pigou,
who first described them.' In the absence of a cigarette tax, for
example, people might consume an inefficiently high number of
cigarettes because they fail to consider the external costs smoking
imposes on others, or even the future costs smoking imposes on
themselves. A high tax rate on cigarettes might serve as a proxy for
those unconsidered costs, and thus reduce smoking to a more efficient
level. 93 Although lottery gambling is not so clearly a candidate for
Pigovian taxation as are cigarettes and alcohol (because its negative
externalities are less pronounced), a Pigovian case could probably be
made for high lottery tax rates. The problem is that proponents of
revenue-maximizing state lotteries are in no position to make the
case. The states cannot do everything in their power through
91. See Clotfelter & Cook, Implicit Taxation, supra note 84, at 535; Rodgers & Stuart,
supra note 88, at 243, 248.
92. See generally A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE (3d ed. 1947)
(pioneering the use of taxes to induce efficient behavioral changes).
93. See, e.g., Gravelle, supra note 64, at 444-51 (evaluating-not very favorably-the
recent tobacco settlement from a Pigovian tax perspective); Michael Grossman & Frank J.
Chaloupka, Cigarette Taxes: The Straw to Break the Camel's Back, 112 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 290, 290 (1997) (discussing the use of cigarette taxes to discourage teenage smoking);
Kenkel & Manning, supra note 30 passim (discussing alcohol taxation as a means to
promote public health goals); W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Smokers' Welfare with
Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 555-56 (1994) (discussing cigarette taxation
for the purpose of discouraging smoking and promoting efficiency by forcing
internalization of costs).
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advertising and other forms of marketing to encourage lottery
consumption, and then turn around and justify the high implicit tax
rates as a means of discouraging consumption. 94 There may be a
Pigovian case for high implicit tax rates on lotteries, but there is not a

Pigovian case for aggressively marketed revenue-maximizing
lotteries. The Pigovian lottery would follow the sumptuary (liquor
store) model-high implicit tax and no attempt to use marketing or
advertising strategies to encourage consumption. 95 Only the Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota lotteries even remotely resemble this
model.9
B. A DistributionallyAttractive Tax?

A high lottery tax might be appealing, despite its efficiency cost,
if it produced a desirable distribution of the tax burden. Surveying
the literature in 1989, Clotfelter and Cook remarked that "[a]bsolute
expenditures [on lottery tickets] appear to be remarkably uniform
over a broad range of incomes. '97 If dollars gambled per capita are
almost flat across the income distribution, then the lottery tax
resembles a head tax (i.e., a tax of a flat dollar amount per person) in
its distributional effect. Like a head tax, its incidence with respect to
income is highly regressive. 98 Recent survey data indicate a pattern of
94. Note the White Knight's Song in Through the Looking Glass: "But I was thinking
of a plan/To dye one's whiskers green/And always use so large a fan/That they could not
be seen." LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 311 (Martin Gardner ed., 1960).
95. See discussion of the sumptuary lottery model infra text accompanying note 168.
96. See supratext accompanying notes 14-17 (describing advertising restrictions in the
lottery statutes of those three states).
97. CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 99.
98. See id. at 221-27. For a challenge to the conventional wisdom that the lottery tax
is regressive, see Lloyd R. Cohen, Lotteries, Liberty and Legislatures, George Mason
University Law School Law and Economics Working Paper No. 00-01 (Feb. 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=210008 (last visited Nov. 15,
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). According to Cohen, the key
question in analyzing the distributional effect of the implicit lottery tax is how the world
would change if the lottery continued to operate, but without the tax. See id. at 9.
Suppose, for example, a state operates a lottery in which one million people-all with low
incomes-wager $10 each, a single winner is paid $5 million, and the state makes a $5
million profit. If the implicit tax is removed, the resulting lottery might take several
different forms. At one extreme, the payout-one winning ticket paying $5 millionmight be unchanged, but the public might wager only $5 million. Cohen concedes that the
implicit tax would be regressive if that were the tax-free alternative; the effect of the tax in
that case is that the state takes $5 million from low-income persons. See id. at 9. At the
other extreme, the public might continue to wager $10 million, but the single winning
ticket might pay $10 million instead of only $5 million. In that case, Cohen contends, the
implicit tax is highly progressive; it has the effect of taking $5 million from the rich lottery
winner (who wins $5 million with the tax, compared to $10 million without). See id.
Cohen offers an educated guess that the most likely result of eliminating the tax is neither
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lottery taxation even more regressive than a head tax. In a 1998
national survey, the National Opinion Research Center found that
household income has little effect on dollars of lottery play up to
above that level dollars of play per
$50,000 income, but that
99
sharply.
off
fall
household
Of course, a lively perennial debate continues on the appropriate
distribution of the tax burden, and it may be possible to defend a
regressive tax, especially in the context of a tax system with other
proportional or progressive elements. It is striking, however, that the
public debate is almost exclusively on the merits of proportional
versus progressive taxes. 1°0 Principled defenses of regressivity are
extremely rare, 10 1 and are unlikely to make much headway with the
of these extremes, but rather an increase in the number of prizes. See id. at 25-27. For
example, the public might continue to wager $10 million, but the tax-free lottery might
offer two winning prizes of $5 million each. In that case, the effect of the implicit tax is
that one person who would be a winner in the tax-free lottery remains poor. Cohen calls
that a "marvelously ambiguous effect that cannot fairly be described as either progressive
or regressive." Id. at 27.
Whatever one may think of the theoretical merits of Cohen's analysis, it is
unlikely to influence the public debate about the distributional effects of lotteries. When
the public sees the government making a $5 million profit by pocketing lottery dollars
gambled by one million poor persons, it is unlikely to be persuaded by Cohen's argument
that the $5 million really comes not from the one million poor but from one unidentified
would-be winner. A distributional argument based on a hypothetical winner in a
hypothetical different lottery is not likely to have much popular appeal.
In addition to imposing a heavy burden on the public imagination, Cohen's
analysis is based on the assumption that the distributional effect of the lottery tax should
be determined ex post-thatis, after the lottery has been held and the winners and losers
are known. If the distributional effect is instead analyzed ex ante-after the tickets are
purchased but before the lottery is held-then the implicit tax is clearly regressive (given
the assumption that the lottery players all have low incomes). With the implicit tax, each
$1 ticket buys a gamble with an expected return of 50 cents; without the tax-under any of
the three scenarios-$1 buys an expected return of $1. The 50 cents implicit tax on each
ticket can be understood as imposed at the time of purchase, with regressive effect,
without regard to eventual winners and losers.
Cohen makes a second, more persuasive point about the distributional effect of
the implicit lottery tax. Even if the tax is regressive, it is only a small part of a state's
revenue system; as long as the distribution of the state's overall tax burden is considered
appropriate, it is not clear why it should be troubling that one small part of the system is
regressive if viewed in isolation. See id. at 8.
99. See Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at 13,33 tbl. 11.
100. E.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX passim (2d ed.
1995) (arguing the superiority of a flat-rate consumption tax to a progressive marginal rate
income tax); JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE
TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 49-73 (1996) (examining arguments for and
against progressivity); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated
Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 57 (1999) (demonstrating
that progressive rates can be welfare-maximizing under some conditions).
101. But see Jeffrey Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Considerationof the
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public. 1°2 In short, the idea that a revenue-maximizing lottery tax is

attractive precisely because of its highly regressive impact is absurd.
Questions of regressivity are at the center of much of the lottery
policy debate.
Lottery opponents complain of regressivity; 10 3
proponents counter not by defending regressivity, but by arguing the
lottery should not be thought of as a tax, 104 or that if it is a tax its

"voluntary" nature makes distributional concerns irrelevant. 10 5

This Article is not intended as another contribution to the

regressivity debate; its critique of lotteries is based on their unique
goal of maximizing government revenue from the consumers of a
particular product. That uniqueness puts a burden on lottery
proponents to justify their revenue-maximizing goal. The only
relevance of regressivity to this argument is the implausibility that
lottery proponents would invoke regressivity in an attempt to carry
their burden of persuasion' 6
C. Frivolous Lotteries and Necessary Utilities?

Rather than attempting to prove the merits of a revenuemaximizing lottery by direct appeal to efficiency or distributional
norms, a lottery defender might claim that a crucial distinction exists
PhilosophicalBases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM J. TAx POL. 221 passim
(1995) (arguing that the only fair tax is a head tax).
102. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 100, at 47-48 (recounting the short, unhappy
life of the "community charge," a sort of head tax, imposed by the Thatcher government
in Great Britain).
103. See, e.g., KARCHER, supra note 14, at 92-97 (setting forth several proposals to
reduce lottery regressivity, including reducing the rate of the implicit tax).
104. See, e.g., Bill Poovey, James, Siegelman Expect Close Alabama Contest,
CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 1998, at B4 (quoting Alabama gubernatorial
candidate Don Siegelman that "the whole point" of his support of a lottery "is to raise
money without raising taxes").
105. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, 2 Democrats Hope Support for Lottery Will Help Break
G.O.P. Grip on South, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at A16 (quoting South Carolina
gubernatorial candidate and lottery supporter Jim Hodges, that South Carolinians "see a
lottery as a voluntary tax that you only pay if you play"). The characterization of the
lottery as a voluntary tax is discussed infra text accompanying notes 107-16.
106. Optimal tax theory attempts to find welfare-maximizing excise tax rates, taking
both efficiency and distributional concerns into account. See Martin S. Feldstein,
DistributionalEquity and the Optimal Structure of Public Prices,62 AM. ECON. REV. 32
passim (1972). Because a revenue-maximizing lottery fares poorly on both efficiency and
distributional counts, it will also fare poorly in the combined optimal tax analysis. See
Clotfelter & Cook, Implicit Taxation, supra note 84, at 541-43 (noting that because of its
regressive distributional effect, a lottery tax rate higher than the rates on alcohol and
tobacco could be optimal only if lotteries were substantially less price elastic than those
other products or if they have greater negative externalities, and "[n]either possibility
seems very likely").
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between lotteries and those government monopolies commonly
viewed as necessities-such as water, power, public transportation,
and the postal service-which justifies revenue maximization for
lotteries but not for utilities. The defender might claim that a lottery
is a voluntary tax, since no one really needs to play, and that revenue
maximization is always acceptable for a voluntary tax.107 By contrast,
the defender would assert that revenue maximization is an
inappropriate goal for a tax on necessities; a revenue-maximizing tax
on water, for example, would be unacceptably burdensome to the
poor. Government can plausibly tell the poor not to play the lottery
if they cannot afford the tax; 0 it cannot tell them not to drink or
wash if tax has made water too expensive.
Despite its superficial appeal, this basis of distinction fares poorly
under scrutiny. First, it is doubtful that lotteries are such a frivolous
luxury for the poor that it would be sufficient to tell them to "just say
no." In a society that bombards the poor with images of conspicuous
consumption and gives them few prospects other than the lottery of
achieving such consumption for themselves, the hope one buys with a
lottery ticket may not be an easily dispensable luxury. Lottery tickets
may be the investments of the poor. 109 In any event, states
distinguishing lotteries from water on the grounds that the poor
should not play will be hypocritical until they stop their aggressive
marketing of lotteries to the poor through advertising"' and the
placement of outlets in poor neighborhoods."' Whatever the abstract
merits of the idea that a revenue lottery is acceptable because those
who cannot afford the tax should not play, that notion cannot be used
to defend lotteries as they are currently marketed.
The attempted distinction between frivolous lottery tickets and
necessary water is misleading in another respect. The concern with
the welfare of the poor expressed in the argument implies that a
107. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 215 (stating, but
not endorsing, the argument).
108. "Don't bet more than you can afford to lose" is anything but a common theme,
however, in lottery advertising.
109. For a well-developed argument along these lines, see generally Edward J.
McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries And Why It Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71
(discussing three explanations of why consumers play lotteries).
110. "New York's 'All you need is a dollar and a dream' ad campaign was particularly
emblematic of the theme that lotteries provide an avenue to financial success. The idea

that a lottery is an investment in your future is particularly troublesome when targeted
toward populations that are least able to afford to play." NGISC REPORT, supra note 2,
at 3.
111. KARCHER, supra note 14, at 58-60 (describing the practice of some lottery states
to locate the heaviest concentration of lottery outlets in poor neighborhoods).
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revenue-maximizing tax on water or electricity would be
objectionable because it would be more regressive than a revenuemaximizing lottery. But the opposite is almost certainly true. As
noted earlier, lottery play actually declines in absolute dollars (and
not merely as a percentage of income) as income increases, making
the lottery tax highly regressive. n2 Although water and electricity
usage may not rise proportionally with income (in which case water
and power taxes would be somewhat regressive), usage almost
certainly rises with income.11 3 Ironically, then, a revenue-maximizing
tax on the luxury of lotteries may be more regressive than a revenuemaximizing tax on the necessities of water and power.
In any event, the necessity-based objection to a government's
extraction of monopoly profits from public utilities can be answered
by a system charging the profit-maximizing price, but then rebating
the implicit tax on subsistence-level consumption (either to the poor,
or to all consumers if means-testing is considered impractical or
undesirable)."'
Despite the cost of rebates, this would almost
certainly increase profits compared with current cost-based pricing of
utilities. This system would maximize revenues (subject to the rebate
constraint) and protect the poor from any tax on necessities." 5 Given
the availability of-and complete lack of interest in-this model for
utility pricing, the necessities-versus-luxuries distinction cannot justify
maximizing lottery revenue while not maximizing revenue from
government-owned utilities.
As weak as the voluntary tax argument is in distinguishing
lotteries from public utilities, the argument is of absolutely no use in
distinguishing revenue-maximizing lotteries from the failure to
impose revenue-maximizing taxes on alcohol and tobacco. If lottery
revenues are voluntary taxes because lotteries are not necessities and
one may choose not to play, then alcohol and tobacco taxes are also

112. See supra text accompanying note 99 (explaining that absolute dollars spent on
lotteries decline as income rises above $50,000).
113. It is not the poor who install automatic sprinkler systems in their expansive
suburban lawns, for example.
114. A somewhat similar system-of a value-added tax combined with a universal
rebate of the tax on subsistence consumption-is described in Lawrence Zelenak, Flat Tax
vs. VAT: Progressivityand Family Allowances, 69 TAX NOTES 1129,1129-32 (1995).
115. The same result could also be reached without a rebate by instituting a two-tier
pricing system. The lower price (reflecting no implicit tax) would be imposed on
subsistence-level water consumption; the higher price would be imposed on all other water
consumption.
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voluntary. Questions of addiction complicate the picture, but just as
much for lotteries as for alcohol and tobacco." 6
D. The American HistoricalPrecedent
Although the current era of state lotteries in the United States
dates back to only 1964, lotteries were common in eighteenth and
nineteenth century America." 7 If these early American lotteries were
run on the revenue-maximizing model, that would at least supply a
historical precedent for the modem approach, and we might then
search for the hidden wisdom in that practice. Of course, even if
history did support revenue-maximizing lotteries, the precedent might
be rejected because circumstances have changed-in particular,
because the development of municipal bond markets and alternative
forms of taxation has decreased the need to exploit the full revenue
potential of lotteries."' The question is moot, however, because early
American history does not provide a precedent for the modern
revenue-maximizing lottery.
First, the states did not grant themselves lottery monopolies. In
9
addition to lotteries for governmental purposes," legislatures
frequently authorized lotteries for charitable purposes, especially
20
churches and educational institutions (private and public).
Lotteries were even authorized for private and semi-private
purposes. 121 Before the Civil War, twenty-one states authorized 186
such lotteries." Favored purposes included relief of debt-ridden

116. See NGISC REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-1 to 4-19 (surveying the literature on the
prevalence and costs of problem and pathological gambling, and making policy
recommendations).
117. For the most comprehensive history of pre-twentieth century American lotteries,
see JOHN SAMUEL EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL: THE LOTTERY IN AMERICA
(1960). Good shorter historical surveys include CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE,

supra note 3, at 32-48; and Rychlak, supra note 14, at 23-44.
118. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 35 (noting the
"absence of other sources of public financing" at the time of the early American lotteries);
Rychlak, supra note 14, at 31 (same).
119. For a detailed summary of lotteries for governmental purposes from 1790 to 1860,
see EZELL, supra note 117, at 101-20.
120. Id. at 137-60 (surveying church and educational lotteries from 1790 to 1860).
Ezell notes that twenty-three states authorized lotteries for educational purposes before
the Civil War. See id. at 160. During this same period states also authorized numerous
lotteries for internal improvements-primarily roads, bridges and canals. Id. at 121-36.
Although such projects would be governmental today, they generally were not in the preCivil War era. See id.
121. Id. at 161-76 (surveying such lotteries up to the Civil War).
122. See id. at 176.
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individuals' 23 and the benefit of Masonic lodges. 24
history of pre-twentieth

century American

The leading

lotteries describes

governmental authorities as "avidly compet[ing] with their citizens for
a share of the lottery's wealth."'" This is hardly precedent for the
carefully guarded monopoly profits of today's state lotteries.
The other crucial difference between historic and modem
practice is in the payout rates. In stark contrast with modern payouts

averaging about 55%,126 the standard in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century was a payout rate of 85%.127 There are several
possible explanations for these high payout rates. One, of course, is
competition.
With churches, schools, and even some private
individuals competing with the states for lottery dollars (albeit only to
the extent the states permitted competition), payout rates would be

higher (and implicit taxes would be lower) than under a state lottery
monopoly."2 Another possibility is that with individuals having so
many opportunities to make a fortune in a rapidly expanding country,
lotteries had to have high payout rates to be attractive. 29 Yet another
possible explanation is that payouts were not intended to maximize

profits. Lotteries had to be authorized by state legislatures, and a
legislature might condition authorization on a high payout, in order to
shift some of the benefit of the lottery from the sponsoring church or
school to the gambling public.
The only American forerunner of the low payout rates
characteristic of modern state lotteries is not a happy example. The
123. The most famous example was Virginia's 1826 grant of authority to Thomas
Jefferson to dispose of land by lottery to pay his debts. See id- at 168-70. Jefferson died
before the lottery could be carried out. See id. at 170.
124. Id. at 176 (noting "the favored position of the Masonic order").
125. Id. at 102.
126. See Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supra note 2, at 7 (based on state lottery data
for fiscal year 1997).
127. R. Clay Sprowls, A HistoricalAnalysis of Lottery Terms, 20 CAN. J. OF ECON. &
POL. SCI., 347, 354-55 (1954). Of forty-nine pre-1815 lotteries surveyed by Sprowls, thirtyeight had payouts at or above 85%. See id. at 355 fig.1. Sprowls notes that the 85%
payout was featured in the advertisements for many lotteries. See id. at 354. Payouts
declined after 1815, but only modestly. Of fourteen post-1815 lotteries considered by
Sprowls, only one had a payout below 75%. See id. at 355. Ezell also refers to "the
customary 15%" withheld from the payout of late eighteenth century lotteries. EZELL,
supra note 117, at 67.
128. As an example of the effect of competition, Ezell notes that a 1780 lottery with a
payout of 80% instead of the standard 85% "proved unpopular." Id. at 67. Even lotteries
with 85% payouts sometimes failed to attract enough consumer interest to succeed. See
id. at 38, 44-45 (providing examples).
129. Sprowls speculates that in the early United States "the alternatives open to an
individual to make a large income were such that gambles had to be more fair than in
older, more established countries." Sprowls, supra note 122, at 356.
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post-Civil War Louisiana Lottery Company enjoyed a lottery
monopoly-not only in Louisiana, but nationally through the use of
the mails 3°0 -and exploited that monopoly by featuring a thenunprecedented payout rate of 52%.131 The monopoly profits inured
state. 132
to the benefit of the owners of the lottery franchise, not to the
As evidence of fraud and corruption in the Louisiana Lottery
accumulated, national sentiment turned overwhelmingly against it,
and it was finally closed down in 1895 by a federal law prohibiting all
interstate commerce in lotteries. 33 Thus, the only pre-twentieth
century lottery with a payout rate designed to extract monopoly
profits (at a rate remarkably similar to the average rate today) was
eradicated by a national crusade ending in federal legislation, and
created a climate so hostile to lotteries that nearly seven decades
passed before another legal lottery appeared in the United States.
For obvious reasons, proponents of today's lotteries prefer not to
claim descent from the Louisiana Lottery, despite its being the only
precedent for modern payout rates.
Whatever the correct explanation for the high historic payoutsapart from the Louisiana aberration-those payouts provide no
support for the much lower payout rates (and higher implicit taxes) of
Pre-modem American lotteries were not
today's lotteries.
government monopolies and they did not extract monopoly profits.
The ascendancy of the profit-maximizing state monopoly lottery is a
late-twentieth century phenomenon.
IV.

OF EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

The Significance of the Status Quo Ante
There exists a plausible explanation as to why states have chosen
lotteries, uniquely among all consumer products, for revenue
maximization. The key is the nonexistence of a legal lottery industry
in any state before the introduction of a state lottery. If a state were
suddenly to propose to maximize tax revenue from espresso drinks,
134
for example, it would face formidable political obstacles. Such a tax

A.

130. Anti-lottery forces had succeeded in eliminating all other lotteries in the country.
EZELL, supra note 117, at 236-41.
131. CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supranote 3, at 38.
132. EZELL, supra note 117, at 242-44.
133. Id. at 242-70 (detailing the rise and fall of the Louisiana lottery); Act of March 2,
1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (prohibiting all interstate commerce in lotteries).
134. There would not be any significant danger that a revenue-maximizing tax would
be considered itself a taking subject to the Constitution's just compensation requirement.
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would eliminate much of the existing consumer surplus of latte
drinkers and much of the profits of the latte industry, and so would be

strenuously resisted by both
lottery, however, the status
revenue-maximizing lottery
comparison is with no lottery

consumers and producers.
quo ante is very different.
creates consumer surplus,
at all (rather than with a less

With a
Even a
if the
heavily-

taxed lottery). 136 On the producer side, the introduction of a lottery

involves no existing (and legal) industry to complain that its profits
are being unfairly reduced.
A political opportunity for revenue maximization is not, of
course, the same thing as a principled justification. Yet the absence
of an existing lottery industry might help to justify a revenuemaximizing lottery. Suppose a particular product (latte, lottery ticket,
or anything else) would cost the consumer $1 per unit if the product
were taxed at rates comparable to those for other products, but would
cost $1.50 if the product were subject to a special revenue-maximizing
tax. In choosing between the two levels of taxation, it appears that
what is at stake-fifty cents more or less of consumer surplus per
unit-is independent of the state of affairs at the time the decision is
made. But this does not take into account the endowment effect-the
name given by economists to the phenomenon that people commonly
demand much more to sell items they own than they would be willing
to pay to buy those same items.137 A corollary is that "[f]orgone gains
In A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934), the Supreme Court sustained a
prohibitively high state tax on butter substitutes against the appellant's objection that the
tax constituted an uncompensated taking of property, in violation of the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. IL at 47. The Court declared that "the single
premise that the amount of the tax is so excessive that it will bring about the destruction of
appellant's business ... furnish[es] no juridical ground for striking down a taxing act." Id.
Unlike the tax in Magnano, a revenue-maximizing tax on a consumer product would not
make the product so expensive as to drive the producers out of business (at least not all of
them); a fortiori, then, a revenue-maximizing tax is not subject to the compensation
requirement.
135. The alternative route to revenue-maximization-direct state ownership of all latte
shops following condemnation of the existing industry-would encounter similarly
strenuous resistance from consumers and producers. It would also trigger the need to pay
just compensation to the owners of the condemned business. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 226 (1897)
(incorporating the compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
136. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 219-21. Consumer
surplus is the excess of the maximum amount a person would be willing to pay for a
particular product, over the amount he actually has to pay. It at 220. Obviously, there is
no consumer surplus from lotteries if there are no lotteries, but there is some consumer
surplus from even a revenue-maximizing lottery.
137. See, e.g., RICHARD W. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
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are less painful than perceived losses.' 13 8 A revenue-maximizing price
of $1.50 costs both the latte drinker and the lottery player fifty cents
of consumer surplus, compared to the alternative of a tax at the lower
level. The cost would be more painful for the latte drinker, however,
because of the difference in starting points. Starting from an existing
price of $1, the latte drinker perceives the new tax burden as a loss.
Starting from the non-existence of the product, the lottery player
perceives the difference between the actual $1.50 price and the
alternative $1 price as merely a foregone gain (if she thinks about it at
all). It simply causes less pain to deprive the gambler of fifty cents of
consumer surplus he has never enjoyed than to deprive the latte
drinker of fifty cents of surplus she has come to view as her
endowment.
Although the endowment effect is largely a consumer
phenomenon, 39 it may also be less troubling from a producer
perspective to impose a revenue-maximizing tax on a previously
illegal industry than on an existing one. Owners of capital may suffer
more from a loss of profits to which they have become accustomed
(as when the latte tax is increased), than from the inability to realize
profits they have never enjoyed in the past (as when they are not
allowed to enter the lottery business).
There are arguments, then, from both consumer and producer
perspectives that the absence of a legal lottery industry before the
introduction of a state lottery provides a principled justification for
the unique status of the revenue-maximizing lottery; other things
being equal, heavy taxation of a previously non-existent product will
cause less consumer pain than equally heavy taxation of an
established product. The remainder of this Part considers possible
objections to this proposed justification. The first possible objection
is that the situation which is claimed to justify revenuemaximization-the previous (legal) non-existence of the product-is
not really unique to lotteries. Arguably the same situation exists in
the case of any currently illegal product, and in the case of any new
product. In particular, the same situation may have existed upon the
repeal of Prohibition and upon the introduction of vanity license
plates. The second objection relates to the bootstrap nature of the
justification. The only reason there was no legal lottery industry
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63-78 (1992) (discussing the endowment effect and the
related concepts of loss aversion and the status quo bias).
138. Id. at 74-75.
139. "Loss aversion does not affect all transactions. In a normal commercial
transaction, the seller does not suffer a loss when trading a good." Id. at 72 n.3.
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before the introduction of state lotteries was that the states had
prohibited private lotteries. Arguably a state should not be able to
bootstrap its way into a revenue-maximizing lottery by artificially
creating a no-lottery status quo ante. Finally, and most significantly,
there is the compelling objection that the previous non-existence of
lotteries, although not irrelevant to a utilitarian analysis, is simply not
significant enough to do all the heavy lifting it is being asked to do;
the endowment effect is a factor favoring relatively heavy taxation of
lotteries, other things being equal, but it does not justify revenue
maximization.
B. Is the Lottery Situation Really Unique?
1. Other Illegal Products and the Repeal of Prohibition
In theory, any illegal product presents a state with the same
opportunity as the lottery to enter the field as a profit-maximizing
monopolist without interfering with the endowments of consumers or
existing producers. The usual problem, of course, is public opposition
to legal-let alone state-sponsored-cocaine or prostitution,
regardless of how attractive the revenue potential may be. Public
disapproval of lotteries emptied the field in the late-nineteenth
century. 40 When a change in public attitudes made lotteries
acceptable seven decades later, 141 states were free to enter and
maximize revenue without opposition from existing consumers or
producers. Such a change from strong disapproval to acceptance may
be a politically necessary condition for a state's ability to maximize
revenue from a particular product;142 states do not attempt to
maximize revenue from other consumer products because the
necessary condition so rarely occurs.
A partial explanation for the shift in attitudes toward lotteries
may be that much of the opposition to lotteries was merely practical,
rather than fundamental. Although the very idea of a lottery was
morally condemned by many during the long decades of lottery
prohibition, others believed that a lottery would be acceptable, if only
it was possible to run one without fraud and corruption. Once New
140. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33 (describing briefly the demise of the
infamous Louisiana Lottery).
141. The first twentieth-century state lottery was New Hampshire's in 1964. See
CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 141-43. Lottery adoptions by
other states followed gradually over the decades. See id. at 143-59.
142. The invention of a new product by the state, such as vanity plates, may also be
sufficient.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Hampshire-desperate to avoid both a sales tax and an income
tax' 4 3-broke the taboo and demonstrated the practicality of a
profitable and scandal-free lottery, the merely practical case for
prohibition disappeared. 144 In the case of most other illegal products
the prohibition is overwhelmingly based on fundamental objections to
the product itself, rather than to corruption in the industry; the
necessary change in attitudes is less likely to occur when the
objections are fundamental.
There is, of course, one other important instance in American
history when an attitude shift, resulting in the legalization of a major
product, did occur-the repeal of Prohibition by the Twenty-first
Amendment in 1933.145 States and the federal government today do

not attempt to maximize revenue from alcohol, either through excise
taxation or through the direct operation of liquor stores. 46 In the
aftermath of the repeal of prohibition, however, revenue-maximizing
alcohol taxes were at least accorded a significant amount of legislative
lip service. The Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying
the Liquor Taxing Act of 1934147 claimed that the tax rates on distilled
spirits and beer were intended "to return the maximum amount of
revenue without incurring the danger of perpetuating illegal liquor
traffic by excessive rates. '148 On the other hand, the Report noted
wine would be
that the "relatively low rates" on various types 1of
"advantageous to the fruit growers of the country.' 49
In light of later developments, it is difficult to take seriously the
claimed intent to maximize tax revenue from spirits and beer. By
1938 bootlegging had been brought under control and the distilling
industry had been firmly reestablished, so liquor taxes could then be
set at revenue-maximizing levels, without the concern for the relative
prices of legal and illegal alcohol. 50 Yet Congress responded by
raising the distilled spirits tax only slightly (from $2.00 to $2.25 per
proof gallon), and the beer tax not at all.'' The Ways and Means
Report contains no indication that the new rate on spirits was
143. CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 141-43.

144. See id. at 150-51.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 25-43.
147. Liquor Taxing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-83, 48 Stat. 313.
148. H.R. REP. No. 73-271, at 1 (1934) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 9774).
149. Id. at 2.
150. See TUN YUAN Hu, THE LIQUOR TAx IN THE UNITED STATES, 1791-1947, at 108
(1950).
151. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 710, 52 Stat. 447, 572 (increasing
the distilled spirits tax).
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intended to maximize revenue, 52 and such an intent seems very
unlikely in light of an earlier Treasury Report indicating that a $5 rate
53
would raise $122 million more annual revenue than a $2 rate.1
Additional evidence that the 1938 rates were not intended to

maximize revenue comes from the congressional response to the
fiscal crisis created by World War II. Congress repeatedly increased
alcohol excise taxes during the war, for the purpose (and with the
effect) of raising revenue. In light of the wartime tax increases, it is

highly unlikely that Congress believed the 1938 tax rates were
revenue-maximizing. 154
Therefore, despite the reference to "the maximum amount of
revenue" in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, a serious attempt

at revenue maximization did not follow the repeal of Prohibition.
There is, however, a plausible explanation, in endowment effect
terms, of why revenue-maximization followed the legalization of
152. In fact, it offers no discussion whatsoever of the rationale for the increase. H.R.
REP. No. 75-1860, at 63-67 (1938) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10233) (where one would
expect to find a discussion, were there a discussion).
153. Tax on Intoxicating Liquor-Joint Hearings before the Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 73d Cong.
313-15 (1933) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4. W36:L66/5).
154. In 1940 Congress raised the distilled spirits tax from $2.25 to $3 per proof gallon,
and raised the beer tax from $5 to $6 per barrel. Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-665,
§ 213-14,54 Stat. 513,524-25 (affecting spirits and beer respectively). The official revenue
estimates were an increase of $76 million (in the first year) from the spirits tax, and an
increase of $46 million from the beer tax. H.R. REP. No. 76-2491, at 3 (1940) (Sup. Does.
No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10443). The next year Congress increased the spirits tax to $4, for an
estimated revenue increase of $122.3 million. Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250,
§ 533, 55 Stat. 689, 708; H.R. REP. No. 77-1040, at 3 (1941) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial
10556). The year after that, Congress increased the spirits tax again-this time to $6 per
proof gallon-and increased the beer tax to $7 a barrel. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No.
77-753, § 602-03, 56 Stat. 798, 970-71 (affecting spirits and beer respectively). The
estimated revenue increases were $266.1 million for the spirits tax and $61.8 million for the
beer tax. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 3 (1942) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10556).
Finally, the Revenue Act of 1943 increased the spirits tax to $9 and the beer tax to $8, with
estimated revenue increases of $370 million for spirits and $70 million for beer. Revenue
Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 302, 58 Stat. 21, 61 (1944); H.R. REP. No. 78-871, at 9
(1943) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10764). Although it is the revenue estimates, rather
than actual results, that indicate the intent of Congress, the tax increases had the desired
effect of greatly increasing revenues. Federal revenue from the excise tax on distilled
spirits increased from about $296 million in 1939 to nearly $1.9 billion in 1946. Hu, supra
note 150, at 111.
It may be that Congress believed that the alcohol tax rates in effect by the end of
the Second World War were at or close to the revenue-maximizing level. Even supposing
that to have been the case, in the post-war decades Congress permitted inflation to erode
the taxes to levels far below revenue maximization. See H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 279-80
(1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2281-82 (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:101-881)
(describing the erosion of the alcohol excise taxes from the 1950s to the 1990s).
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lotteries but did not follow the legalization of alcohol. The crucial
difference is in the duration of the two prohibitions-just fourteen
years for alcohol, 55 compared with the better part of a century for
lotteries. Fourteen years were simply not long enough to establish
the unavailability of alcohol as the endowment effect baseline.
Drinkers could remember the price of legal alcohol fourteen years
before, and they would consider their endowment to be availability at
that price, rather than the short-lived legal unavailability at any price.
No state lottery player, by contrast, had any memory of being able to
play a legal lottery at any price; unavailability was clearly the lottery
endowment baseline. The same analysis applies, of course, on the
producer side. There was no legal lottery industry in existence at the
introduction of state lotteries, but upon the repeal of Prohibition,
brewers and distillers still existed to object to revenue-maximizing
taxes (or to a state takeover of their facilities).156

The brevity of the Prohibition era thus plausibly distinguishes
revenue-maximizing lotteries from the failure to impose revenuemaximizing alcohol taxes in the 1930s. After only fourteen years of
Prohibition, it was unclear whether Prohibition or the pre-Prohibition
era should be taken as the baseline for purposes of applying
endowment effect analysis to alcohol consumers. Similarly, the loss
to producers from revenue-maximizing taxes would fall on the stillexisting brewers and distillers, who may have viewed as their
endowment the right to sell alcohol subject to pre-Prohibition levels
of tax.
2. New Products
The endowment effect on consumer analysis is the same for
newly-developed products as it is for previously illegal products. If
consumers will find a revenue-maximizing lottery tax bearable
because they have never experienced a more lightly taxed lottery,
155. Prohibition was established by the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 and repealed
by the Twenty-first in 1933. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend.
XX.
156. "Some alcoholic-beverage manufacturing and distribution firms ... pursued
different activities [during Prohibition] such as making yeast or industrial alcohol or just
waited for their plants to become useful again. They clearly still had plenty of money, for
they spent a great deal on repeal efforts." JOHN C. BURNHAM, BAD HABITS: DRINKING,
SMOKING, TAKING DRUGS, GAMBLING, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, AND SWEARING IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 28-29 (1993). Some breweries survived by manufacturing legal
"near beer" through a process which involved first manufacturing real beer. STANLEY
BARON, BREWED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF BEER AND ALE IN THE UNITED STATES
313-14 (1962); SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, PROHIBITION: THE LIE OF THE LAND 40

(1981).
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then they should find a revenue-maximizing tax on (for example)
high-definition television (HDTV) equally bearable. Under this
objection, the consumer endowment effect justification for lottery
taxation fails because states and the federal government do not
attempt to impose revenue-maximizing taxes on newly-developed
products.
The problem with this objection is that it addresses only the
consumer side of the endowment effect. From the producer
perspective, a revenue-maximizing tax on HDTV would not deprive
producers of profits to which they have become accustomed, but it
would deprive them of expected future profits, and that expectation
alone may have been enough to create an endowment effect. There
would be no such expectation, of course, if it were established
government policy to impose revenue-maximizing taxes on all new
products. Such a general policy would avoid the endowment effect
problem, but only at the cost of severely discouraging new product
research and development.
3. Vanity Plates
The argument for a revenue-maximizing lottery based on the
previous non-existence of the product would have been equally
applicable to a revenue-maximizing vanity plate auction, but only at
the time states first offered vanity plates. Never having been able to
buy vanity plates more cheaply, consumers would not have been
subject to the endowment effect. And given the absence of an
existing private vanity plate industry, a vanity plate
auction would
1 7
have done little harm from the producer perspective.
In fact, for reasons not relating to the status quo ante, a vanity
plate auction seems much easier to justify than a revenue-maximizing
lottery. In contrast to the highly regressive effect of the lottery tax, a
vanity plate auction would almost certainly be strongly progressive.
The Hong Kong example suggests that some affluent persons would
be willing to pay five-, six-, and even seven-figure amounts for
especially desirable plates." 8 In addition, a vanity plate auction does
not raise the same concerns as a revenue lottery about exploitation of
addicts or about the state's profiting from behavior many believe to
157. The introduction of vanity plates may have done some harm to the existing
bumper sticker industry. Of course, a revenue-maximizing auction would not have
depressed demand for bumper stickers as much as the actual practice of selling vanity
plates at one (relatively low) price.
158. See discussion of the Hong Kong experience with vanity plate auctions, supra text
accompanying notes 77-79.
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be immoral.15 9 The more frivolous nature of vanity plates also makes
it easier to justify revenue maximization. It is very easy to respond
"just say no" to the person unhappy about the high price of his
desired vanity plates. After all, he can express the exact same
message, in nearly the same place, with a bumper sticker (or even on
an unofficial front license plate in some states), albeit without the
cooperation of the state. But a poor lottery player faced with a
revenue-maximizing lottery tax may have no other way to pursue a
dream of affluence; even if he has access to other forms of legal
gambling, those other forms offer much smaller potential winnings.
It would be inconsistent for a state to attempt to justify a
revenue-maximizing lottery based on the previous non-existence of
lotteries, if the state declined to adopt a revenue-maximizing vanity
plate auction under analogous circumstances. To have decided
against the auction approach, however, a state must have been aware
of the possibility of an auction. It seems likely that states originally
failed to auction vanity plates because of a failure of imagination, or
because of the logistical difficulties in the pre-internet era.t6° If that is
correct, then the states did not really decline to auction vanity plates;
they simply never considered auctions an option. Absent state
consideration of the option, the original failure to auction vanity
plates cannot be considered an adverse precedent to the revenuemaximizing lottery.
With the example of Hong Kong and the resources of the
internet, states are now aware (or at least they should be) of the
auction possibility. But decades of selling vanity plates at low prices
have created an endowment effect, so that a change to auctions now
would be painful to consumers in a way that the original adoption of
an auction approach would not have been.161 In short, the original
159. In fact, states commonly decline to profit from disapproved vanity plate behavior,
by refusing to issue plates with vulgar or obscene messages. See, e.g., Kahn v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the state's
refusal to issue a vanity license plate with a stenographic shorthand for a common four
letter obscenity); Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424, 424 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973) (upholding the state's refusal to issue a plate reading "EZLAY," but noting that the
plaintiff was free to put the same message on the frame of his license plate); McMahon v.
Iowa Dep't of Transp., 522 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Iowa 1994) (upholding, against a constitutional
challenge, the state's refusal to issue a vanity plate which would read as "EATME" in a
mirror). But see Carr v. Dir. of Revenue, 799 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(ordering state to issue requested license reading "ARYAN-I", because of lack of
statutory authority to refuse to issue license plates with inflammatory words).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
161. This is not to say that, on balance, it would be a bad idea for states to begin
auctioning vanity plates. It is harder, however, to justify a switch to auctions now than it
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failure to auction vanity plates is distinguishable from the lottery
situation because states were not originally aware of the option of
auctioning vanity plates, and the failure to switch to auctions now is
distinguishable on the grounds that an endowment effect has
developed following many years of low-priced sales.
C. The Bootstrap Problem
The bootstrap nature of the endowment effect justification for
revenue-maximizing lotteries is troubling. By prohibiting lotteries for
many decades, states artificially created the conditions under which
revenue-maximizing lotteries could be introduced without either
consumers or producers suffering any loss of endowment. A state
invoking the previous state-created illegality of lotteries as the
justification for revenue-maximization calls to mind the parricide who
threw himself on the mercy of the court as an orphan. This unclean
hands objection would not apply if the previous absence of lotteries
had been unrelated to state action; it has intuitive appeal, however,
when such previous absence is the result of state prohibition.
On reflection, however, the bootstrap objection has little force as
long as the state did not cynically prohibit lotteries for the purpose of
making it possible to introduce a revenue-maximizing lottery many
decades later. It seems safe to assume that nineteenth century lottery
prohibitions were based on nineteenth century concerns about
morality, fraud, and corruption, rather than on far-sighted solicitude
for state coffers almost a century later; if that assumption is correct,
the bootstrap objection fails.
D. Can the Endowment Effect Bear the EntireBurden of
Justification?
Even accepting that lotteries were uniquely well-suited for
revenue-maximization from an endowment effect perspective, and
even putting aside the bootstrap objection, there remains the question
of how much weight reasonably can be placed on this justification.
The endowment effect justification appeals, of course, to
utilitarian norms. The point is that a tax imposes a smaller loss of
utility, all else being equal, when there is no endowment effect.
Ideally this consideration would be incorporated as one factor in a
utilitarian analysis of the optimal tax rates on different consumer
products. The endowment effect would be a factor favoring a
would have been to justify auctions from the beginning.
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relatively high rate of tax on lotteries. The utilitarian analysis would
also consider, however, the demand elasticities for different products
and the distributional effects (by income or by wealth) of taxes on
different products. 162 A low elasticity of demand points toward a high
rate of tax (because deadweight loss will be small), as does the fact
that a particular product is consumed primarily by the affluent
(because of the declining marginal utility of money, the affluent will
suffer a relatively small loss of utility from a high tax burden).
Although consideration of the endowment effect suggests a high tax
on lotteries, the elasticity factor may point toward a higher tax on
other products with lower elasticities of demand, and the
distributional factor points strongly against a high tax on lotteries
(since levels of lottery play are inversely related to levels of
income). 163
The historical conditions surrounding the introduction of state
lotteries may well have been unique from an endowment effect
perspective, but the uniqueness of this single factor does not justify a
uniquely aggressive revenue policy for lotteries. The endowment
effect analysis suggests that there is a utilitarian argument for taxing a
lottery more heavily than another product with the same elasticity of
demand and the same distribution of consumption by income levels.
It does not suggest, however, that lotteries should always be taxed
more heavily than other products even when other things are not
equal, and it certainly does not suggest that social welfare will be
maximized by raising as much tax revenue as possible from lotteries.
In short, the endowment effect is just one factor in a comprehensive
utilitarian analysis of optimal tax rates on consumer products, and
there is no reason to think that incorporating the endowment effect
into such an analysis would result in a directive to operate a revenuemaximizing lottery.
CONCLUSION

No apparent justification exists for states to extract every
possible dollar of revenue from lottery consumers when they make no
attempt to do the same from consumers of any other product. In the
absence of a justification, states should abandon lotteries as we know
162. See Clotfelter & Cook, Implicit Taxation, supra note 84, at 541-43. The authors
explain that the standard analysis for determining the optimal allocation of tax burdens
among different products takes into account the relative elasticities of demand of the
products, and the patterns of consumption of the products over the income distribution.
See id. The standard analysis does not incorporate endowment effect considerations.
163. See Clotfelter, Turn of the Century, supranote 2, at 17-18,36 tbl. 11.
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them."6 That does not mean that states should necessarily surrender
their lottery monopolies. Despite concerns about problem gamblers,
the existence of a lottery may well enhance consumer welfare;
millions of enthusiastic participants certainly seem to think so. And a
state monopoly may be a reasonable response to concerns about
fraud and corruption, and to economies of scale. It does not follow,
however, that the states should therefore extract monopoly profits,
any more than a municipal water company should do so.
In their classic study of lotteries, Cook and Clotfelter suggest two
lottery models as alternatives to revenue maximization. A consumer
lottery would be run to maximize consumer welfare, not government
profits. 165 At the extreme, this would mean no implicit tax,166 but a tax
consistent with the excise taxes on other products would be

reasonable.1 67 By contrast, a sumptuary lottery would be based on
paternalistic state disapproval of gambling, coupled with a belief that
prohibition simply does not work. 68 Existing demand would be
accommodated, but there would be no attempt at promotion. This is
the analogue of the state liquor store. Although the implicit tax rate

would be high (to discourage consumption), the absence of any
marketing would keep revenues far below profit-maximizing levels.
Depending on attitudes toward gambling within a state, either a

consumer lottery or a sumptuary lottery is a defensible choice.

69

164. One can imagine a situation in which a legislator could justifiably support a
revenue-maximizing lottery under severe political constraints. The legislator might
believe that the only politically feasible way to fund a desperately needed new program is
with a revenue-maximizing lottery, and that the net result of the new revenue source and
spending program will be an improvement in the public welfare compared to the status
quo ante. Under those constraints, the legislator could be justified in supporting a
revenue-maximizing lottery. What would not be justified, however, is the behavior of
those political actors who imposed the constraints, which ruled out other sources of
funding for the desperately needed program (including both other taxes and decreases in
other spending programs).
165. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 242-43.
166. This possibility is suggested by McCaffery, supra note 109, at 119 (arguing that
because poor persons play lotteries out of need, any tax on lotteries is of doubtful
fairness).
167. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, SELLING HOPE, supra note 3, at 247.
168. See id. at 242-43.
169. The public has not rejected either the consumer lottery or the sumptuary lottery,
because neither model has been seriously presented for public consideration. The political
success of revenue-maximizing lottery proponents in most states may owe as much to their
ability to set the political agenda as it does to the actual condition of public opinion.
Suppose the lottery question is to be decided by popular vote, and the voting public is
divided into three groups of equal size-the revenue maximizers (RM), the consumer
advocates (CA), and the moralists (MO). If they were presented with three options-a
revenue-maximizing lottery (RML), a consumer lottery (CL), or no lottery (NL), their
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What is not defensible is the dominant model today, the revenuemaximizing lottery.

preference orderings would be as follows (the fourth possibility, a sumptuary lottery, is
excluded for ease of illustration):
Preference Ordering
Voting Group
RML-CL-NL
RM
CL-RML--NL
CA
NL-CL-RML
MO
The consumer advocates prefer RML to NL because even a revenue-maximizing
lottery creates consumer surplus compared to no lottery; the moralists prefer CL to RML
because it results in less ill-gotten gain to the state.
Assuming each group votes in accordance with its preference ordering, RML will
win over NL by a two-to-one vote, if the voters are presented with only the RML and NL
options. If consumer advocates were in control of the agenda, however, they could
present voters with a choice between CL and NL, and CL would also win over NL by a
two-to-one vote. They could also present voters with a choice between CL and RML,
which CL would also win by a two-to-one vote. Thus, the fact that voters generally prefer
a revenue lottery to no lottery does not necessarily mean voters would still select a
revenue lottery if consumer lottery proponents were in control of the agenda. On the
importance of agenda-setting power in situations involving more than two options, see
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:

IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12-15 (1997).

USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
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APPENDIX
Approximating Monopoly Profits with an Excise Tax
Figure 1 illustrates the situation of a state which has given itself a
monopoly over a particular product. Unlike a firm in a competitive
industry, which faces a horizontal demand curve, as a monopolist the
state faces a downward-sloping demand curve. The state's marginal
cost is represented by MC, average cost by AC, demand by D, and
marginal revenue by MR. The figure represents the special case
where MC, AC, and MR intersect at a single point. In a competitive
industry, a firm's marginal cost curve would also be its supply curve;
thus the firm would sell quantity Q. at price P0. As a monopolist,
however, the state will maximize its profit by setting its output at the
point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Thus it will sell
quantity Q1 at price P1. The state's monopoly profit is the difference
between the unit price (P1) and the average cost (PA), multiplied by
the number of units sold. It is represented by the shaded rectangle in
Figure 1.

Figure 1

MC

P1

M
CA

Q1

Qo
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Now suppose that instead of monopolizing an industry, the state
leaves the industry in the hands of a number of competitive firms, but
decides to impose a revenue-maximizing excise tax on the product.
This situation is illustrated by Figure 2. The industry supply curve (in
the absence of the excise tax) is represented by S, which is the sum of
the marginal cost curves of all the firms in the industry. By
hypothesis, it is identical to MC in Figure 1. Also by hypothesis, the
demand curves (D) in the two figures are also identical. Absent an
excise tax, the industry will produce at the intersection of the supply
and demand curves, resulting in quantity Q0 being sold at price P0-the same result as if there had been competition in Figure 1.
What happens if the state imposes an excise tax in the amount of
P1 - PAc per unit? The tax functions as an addition to the marginal
cost of the production of all firms, so the supply curve (the sum of
marginal cost curves) simply shifts upward by the amount of the tax.
The new curve is represented by ST. The intersection of supply and
demand is now at quantity Q1 and price P,. The state's tax revenue is
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the per unit tax of P1 - PAC, multiplied by the Q, units sold, and is

represented by the shaded area in Figure 2. This is the same as the
state's monopoly profits in Figure 1.
The results are this tidy only in the special case where MC, AC,
and MR intersect at a single point. If average cost is below marginal
cost at the intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue, then
imposing an excise tax equal to the monopolist's per unit profit will
result in a lower quantity sold than the quantity sold by the
monopolist. Thus the excise tax revenue would be somewhat less
than the monopoly profits.170 Conversely, if average cost is above
marginal cost at the intersection of marginal cost and marginal
revenue, then an excise tax equal to the monopolist's per unit profit
would actually result, in the short run, in a higher quantity sold than
the quantity sold by the monopolist. This could not be sustained in
the long run, however, because it would put the industry in a position
where average cost exceeded price.

170. It would not necessarily follow that the state would make more money by taking
over the industry than by imposing the revenue-maximizing excise tax because taking over
the industry would require the payment of compensation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, whereas an excise tax would not.

44
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